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Introduction
The continued increase in the crude oil price since 2004
has given credence to analysts’ assertion of change in
market dynamics. According to Rafael Ramirez, ‘‘the
oil market has gone through a definitive structural
change’’.1 While demand patterns are expected to
respond to these changes, the ‘‘dash for gas’’ becomes
more glaring and inevitable. This has resulted in higher
rates of gas consumption. For example, in India the
growth rate of gas consumption in the last decade
was about four times that of coal.2 Analysts hope that
gas ‘‘. . . will have a far-reaching impact on the world
economy, bringing new opportunities and risks, new
interdependencies and geopolitical alignments’’.3
This optimism has resulted in more exploration
and production activities in many gas-rich countries.
This has been the situation in Trinidad and Tobago
in the past few years. In the Americas, the nation
has become the largest supplier of liquefied natural
gas (‘‘LNG’’). About 80 per cent of US imports are
produced in Trinidad and Tobago.4 The favourable
economic terrain and stable polity has contributed
immensely in attracting energy companies from across
the globe. In the euphoria of an expected energy boom,
the nation is yet to design a unique fiscal regime for
gas despite the increase in gas exploitation.
Against this background, the author questions the
appropriateness of using basically the same fiscal
regime for both oil and gas projects. The paper attempts
to make a case for a separate tax system for gas in the
twin-island nation. In evaluating the existing regime,
this work projects the peculiarities of gas in Trinidad
and Tobago and in the world energy sector.
1 ‘‘Chavez gets heavy’’, Petroleum Economist, November 2004,
p.2.
2 F.E. Banks, ‘‘An Introduction to the Economics of Natural
Gas’’ (2003) 27 OPEC Review 27.
3 D. Yergin and M. Stoppard, ‘‘The Next Prize’’ (2003) 103
Foreign Affairs Journal 82.
4 A. Webb-Vidal, ‘‘When life, and not just carnival is a gas’’,
Financial Times, January 26, 2005, p.11.
This study is imperative as the nation aims to
maximise benefits from the natural resource. The work
is relevant because an efficient tax structure for gas
would benefit the Trinis5 and also encourage continued
foreign investment. Significantly, the question is a
current challenge not just for the Trinis but for many
gas-rich countries. Interestingly, this single country
study captures a strong theme in the energy industry.
The paper attempts to answer the research question
using a descriptive analysis. By highlighting the
inherent inadequacies of the existing (oil) tax structure
used for gas exploitation, the answer becomes obvious.
Five essential characteristics of tax regimes are the
criteria used for evaluating the regime. They include
neutrality, stability, government take, imposition and
administration, and predictability.
These criteria are explained in the next section
after a brief on the peculiarities of gas. The third
section presents the existing regime and subsequently
analyses it in relation to gas. Thereafter, the study is
concluded.
Framework for analysis
This section briefly explains why gas is different from
oil and other minerals. The discussion covers the nature
of gas globally and in Trinidad and Tobago especially.
It also explains the major features expected from a
fiscal regime for gas in Trinidad and Tobago.
Peculiarities of gas6
The international gas sector has experienced an
increase in demand with supply increasing at a slower
rate. While demand has remained fairly price inelastic,
supply response to market signals has been slow
due to risk considerations.7 The gradual peaking of
production in major consuming nations raises supply-
side concerns. The existence of reasonable proven
reserves in very remote and politically troublesome
countries has not helped matters.8 This explains the
exodus of international oil companies (‘‘IOCs’’) into
the few investor-friendly gas-rich countries.
Gas, in the international energy sector, is charac-
terised by the following:
• Lack of a trading international market: Although
there are three fully established regional markets,
the development and production of gas requires
a prospective buyer. Hence, the need for medium
and long-term contracts between producers and
buyers before development and production starts.
The alternative of developing a domestic market
is difficult. This is because it requires technology,
investment and infrastructure that are lacking in
most gas-rich countries/regions.
5 Nationals of Trinidad and Tobago.
6 Emphasis, here, shall be on LNG—a major chunk of TT’s gas
reserves.
7 IEA,Flexibility inNaturalGas Supply andDemand (OECD/IEA,
Paris, 2002), pp.13–23.
8 B. Williams, ‘‘Debate grows over US gas supply crisis as
harbinger of global gas production peak’’, Oil and Gas Journal,
July 21, 2003.
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• No single global reference price: Following from
the above, the commerciality of a gas field can
only be determined by the price in a contract or
an identified market for that field’s production.
Specifically, in most part of Europe and Asia-
Pacific pricing of long-term contracts is indexed
to crude oil price.9 The United Kingdom uses its
National Balancing Point (‘‘NBP’’) gas price to
index long-term contract pricing. Similarly, North
America uses the Henry Hub gas price (for both
pipeline and LNG contracts).10
• Huge capital requirements for projects resulting in
financial difficulties: Typically, the LNG supplier
bears the cost of liquefaction, plant and harbour
facilities.
• Moderate exploration risk and few losses due to better
technology.11
• Reduced capital and operating costs of LNG vessels
resulting in transportation advantage. This follows
from the increasing number and sizes of new
LNG vessels. Globally, nearly 60 carriers are being
constructed with higher capacity over 150,000m3.12
• Increasing demand resulting from gas-power linkage
and new technological innovation: At an annual 2.3
per cent rate of increase, global consumption of
gas will almost double by 2030. Power generation,
accounting for 59 per cent of the increase, would
drive this growth. Combined cycle gas turbines
would contribute most to this given its low capital
costs, construction lead-time and low economies
of scale.13 In the United States, for instance, new
gas-fired plants are being built for electricity
generation.14 Considering the advantages of such
plants (over coal-fired ones), gas has overtaken
coal (and oil) in the static sectors. The Energy
Information Administration projects that gas
would fire 80 per cent of new generating plants
in the United States between now and 2025.15
Global capacity of gas-to-liquid plants, similarly,
is expected to reach 2.4 million barrels per day by
2030.16
In addition to the above features, the gas industry in
Trinidad and Tobago:
• is growing at a very fast rate relative to the
stagnant oil industry: production and utilisation
of natural gas increased by 17.8 per cent and 41.2
per cent respectively between October 2003 and
June 200417;
9 L’Hegaret et al., ‘‘International Market Integration for Natural
Gas? A Cointegration Analysis of Prices in Europe, North
America & Japan’’ (2003) 17 The Energy Journal 47–62.
10 A.E. Mazighi, ‘‘Some risks related to the Short-Term Trading
of Natural Gas’’ (2004) 28 OPEC Review 227–238.
11 SPE International, ‘‘Technology to the rescue as stranded
gas seeks an outlet’’ (2004) 181 SPE Review 6–7.
12 M. Quinlan, ‘‘It’s all about to happen’’,Petroleum Economist,
November 2004.
13 IEA, World Energy Outlook (2004) 129–167.
14 C. Alston, ‘‘Natural Gas: Bridge to a clean energy future’’,
PPI Policy Rep., June 2003.
15 EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2003 with projections to
2025—Overview (January 2003) (www.eia.doc.gov).
16 See IEA, n.13 above.
17 Ministry of Finance, Trinidad and Tobago; Review of the
Economy 2004, p.19 (www.finance.gov.tt).
• has a proven reserve of 20.8tcf (trillion cubic
feet) projected to last 20 years at the current rate
of depletion18; possible of 5.9tcf and probable of
8.6tcf19;
• is experiencing rising prices especially in the
export market; in the past three years, gas price
in the United States (major buyer), have grown by
700 per cent20 ;
• has a thriving domestic market that consumed
13.76 billion m3 of gas in 2003.21
The above features basically make the economics of gas
projects, especially in Trinidad and Tobago, different
from oil.
Criteria for evaluating a fiscal regime for gas
Given the above, this subsection• presents the basic Q1
characteristics of a tax regime suitable for the gas sector
in Trinidad and Tobago.
Neutrality
Neutrality of a fiscal regime implies that ‘‘it should
not alter decisions on which projects within the (gas)
industry are undertaken and which are not, or on the
techniques, the extent or the pace of production’’.22 It is
equivalent to the requirement for economic efficiency
in taxation by not influencing economic behaviour.23
Alongside economic rent and discount rate,
neutrality is fundamental to reconciling the interests
of government and companies.
Economic rent may be defined as ‘‘the difference
between the cost of production for given deposit and
the cost of production for a marginal deposit’’.24 In
other words, it is ‘‘the excess of total revenue derived
from activity over the sum of the supply prices of all
capital, labour and other inputs’’.25 Discount rate is
simply a measure of the time value of money and a
major criterion for investment decisions.
Due to certain reasons, it is difficult to create
the ideal neutral tax regime that captures economic
rent.26 First, the variables involved make it practically
complex to estimate the economic rent correctly.
Secondly, the country risk and the manner in which the
tax is perceived affect the discount rate. The discount
rate itself is confidential. Finally, capturing all the
economic rent may be inefficient.
Non-neutrality is important despite the difficulty
in achieving neutrality. Therefore, a neutral tax system
for gas should not:
18 See Webb-Vidal, n.5 above.
19 World Market Research Ltd, ‘‘Trinidad and Tobago to
chair Gas Exporting Countries Forum, host April meeting’’
(www.worldmarketsanalysis.com).
20 V.M. Nazarov, Prospects of establishing the World (Global) Gas
Market (UN Round Table, 2004).
21 CIA, Economy of Trinidad and Tobago (www.cia.gov).
22 R. Garnaut and A.C. Ross, Taxation of Mineral Rents (1983),
p.126.
23 S. James and C. Nobes, The Economics of Taxation (7th ed.,
2000). p.303.
24 H. Hughes, ‘‘Economic rents, the distribution of gains from
mineral exploitation and mineral development policy’’ (1975)
3 World Development 811–825.
25 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.26.
26 P. Daniel, ‘‘Evaluating state participation in mineral
projects: Equity, infrastructure and taxation’’ in J.M. Otto, ed.,
Taxation of Mineral Enterprises (1995), p.168.
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• attract too many investors to the industry
resulting in excessive exploration activities;
• encourage or cause existing investors to with-
draw from Trinidad and Tobago;
• discourage prospective entrants into the indus-
try;
• ignore cost and price considerations peculiar to
Trinidad and Tobago;
• encourage selective investment based on a
project’s size, location, richness, risk and technol-
ogy.
Neutrality may, therefore, be achieved by targeting the
tax at profit even though it differs from economic rent.27
Despite the importance of neutrality, as presented
above, many governments have failed to apply the
concept practically. This explains why it is being used
as a criterion for evaluation.
Early government take28
The price paid by the investor to the government
for exploring and exploiting resources owned by the
state may be referred to as ‘‘government take’’. In
some production sharing contracts (‘‘PSCs’’), it is ‘‘the
total government share of revenues not associated
with cost recovery’’29. Government take, in this
paper, is simply government revenue from mineral30
production. Government take, as well as neutrality,
is a function of the quantitative nature of the regime.
Depending on the fiscal system, government take may
come at different stages of the project. Because equity
is the underlying principle of government take, a
fiscal regime for gas should take into account the
proven reserve of gas in relation to the socio-economic
situation in Trinidad and Tobago.
The timing and level of government take is of
paramount importance to investors. They are key
investment decision criteria. ‘‘Early government take’’
basically follows from the discount rate discussed
earlier and it implies early revenue to government.
Although companies have a higher discount rate,
governments reasonably need revenue early in the
life of the project. This would enable government to
mitigate the social and political risk that may arise from
not collecting revenue early in the life of the project.
The issue of reasonable early government take
is particularly relevant in the case of Trinidad and
Tobago. This is because the gas reserves are expected
to run out in 20 years from now.31 The government and
people of Trinidad and Tobago should be reasonably
assured of revenue from gas projects immediately
production starts.32
An effective fiscal system for gas should capture
this concern in the light of gas production life span.
Therefore it should reconcile companies’ high discount
rate with government’s need for secure revenue
27 P. Crowson, ‘‘Economic rent and the mining industry’’
(1998) 13 Journal of Mineral Policy, Business and Environment 22.
28 May also be called ‘‘early tax take’’.
29 D. Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and
Production Sharing Contracts (1994), p.303.
30 Mineral, here, includes oil, gas and other valuable metals
such as diamonds, gold, silver and copper.
31 See Webb-Vidal, n.5 above.
32 T.W. Walde, ‘‘A view on the merits of petroleum royalties’’,
Oxford Energy Forum, August 1996, p.14.
from the depletable resource. The regime, in essence,
should reflect the economic and political realities of
government. The importance of early tax take in a
Trinidadian fiscal regime for gas is glaring.
Stability
Stability of the fiscal regime must remain unaltered.33
The potential of a tax system to raise revenue depends
on investors’ perception of its stability. This is because,
‘‘in countries where governments make very frequent
changes to their fiscal regimes, investors may react
by putting a risk premium on their discount rates’’.34
Therefore, stability is desirable because it minimises
the perceived risk to the investor.35 Fiscal stability
is a function of stability in government policy and
flexibility of the regime.
A stable fiscal structure is not one that merely
contains ‘‘stabilisation clauses’’ in the contracts. Rather
it is one that adapts to changes in the prices
of commodities and gas (in the various markets),
production costs, productivity, recovery factor, and
technology. Essentially, fiscal regimes change because
of the changes in these variables. Unfortunately,
stabilisation clauses ignore them. Attempts to capture
them through ‘‘renegotiation clauses’’ fail because to
anticipate and account for everything that may occur
in the life of the agreement is nearly impossible.36
Given the relatively stable polity in Trinidad and
Tobago, a stable fiscal regime should reflect flexibility
and adaptability. Adaptability may be realised simply
by focusing the taxes mainly on profit or NPV. Stability
is a useful criterion for evaluating regimes due to
investors’ interest in political, legal and monetary
stability for the duration of their venture.
Imposition and administration
Imposition and administration are two components of
tax management.
Imposition refers to the process of setting the vari-
ables and parameters37 for each of the tax instruments
in the regime. It requires a firm understanding of how
the economy works and is continuous. It is imposi-
tion that makes a tax efficient or otherwise because it
sets the basis for effective administration. The prod-
uct of this process is either a simple or a complex tax
structure.
A developing economy, such as Trinidad and
Tobago, requires a simple regime for easy under-
standing and adaptation in an already complex gas
industry.
Administration is the other side of the same
coin—tax management. It is the process of enforcing
the tax regime by assessing tax liabilities with
the objective of collecting the appropriate revenue.
Administration is also a continuous task and basically
addresses issues of adequate tax specialists, as well as,
administrative (assessing and collecting) costs. These
33 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.88.
34 A.G. Kemp, ‘‘Economic considerations in the taxation of
petroleum’’ in K. Khan, ed., Petroleum resources and development.
Economic, legal and policy issues for developing countries (1987),
p.124.
35 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.88.
36 See Johnston, n.29 above, p.174.
37 They include the tax rates, charges, duties, and the
composition of the tax base.
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issues should be of utmost concern in Trinidad and
Tobago where ‘‘companies are exploiting a number of
anomalies in the (existing) tax system’’.38
These concepts are relevant because the neutrality
of a fiscal regime depends on the ease of imposition and
effective administration.39 It is ironic, however, that
easily imposable taxes pose administrative difficulties.
The reverse is the case for taxes that are difficult to
impose. Generally, taxes may be in any of the above
scenarios or difficult to impose and administer.
The ideal regime for gas in Trinidad and Tobago
should be one that captures the basic concepts of
transaction cost and risk allocation. This is because
‘‘complex tax packages which often need adapta-
tion increase transaction cost both for initial contract
negotiations and in terms of prompting subsequent
negotiation scenarios’’.40
Predictability
The predictability of a fiscal regime depends on the
general character of the tax structure. Predictability
of a tax regime relates to issues of transparency and
negotiation of fiscal terms. In other words, an investor
should be able to determine the expected returns from
investments after correctly calculating the potential
fiscal obligations.
Too many variables should not be open to
negotiation but rather be specified for uniformity.
For gas, especially, the regime should provide a level
playing field for all to encourage prospective new
entrants.41 This characteristic is particularly essential
in order to reflect better the growing importance of gas
production in Trinidad and Tobago.42
In this section the author has described the pecu-
liarities of gas, as distinct from oil, in terms of market
dynamics and project economics both in Trinidad and
Tobago and internationally. The section has also cov-
ered the characteristics of a fiscal regime for gas with
emphasis on what the regime should address. These
criteria will form the basis for analysing the existing
regime.
Fiscal issues
This section of the paper is divided into two. The
first subsection presents the salient features of the
modified oil fiscal regime now being used for gas
projects. The second analyses the regime based on the
criteria stated in section two and raises key issues
relevant to answering the research question.
Overview of the existing regime43
Structure
See Table 1.•Q2
38 C. Rampersad, ‘‘New oil and gas tax regime almost
complete’’, Trinidad and Tobago Express, April 20, 2005
(www.trinidadexpress.com).
39 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.89.
40 See Walde, n.32 above, para.3.
41 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘‘Comparative mining tax
regimes’’ (www.pwcglobal.com).
42 J. Kerr, ‘‘Trinidad & Tobago Considering New Energy Tax
Regime’’ (www.worldmarketsanalysis.com).
43 Except where explicitly stated, the terms of the PSC are from
Ministry of Energy, Trinidad and Tobago, 2003 Model Contract
(www.energy.gov.tt).
Other features
• Tax holidays: This is granted variously. The BG
Group, for instance, got a 10-year tax holiday.44
• Fees: Annual holding fee of $1 million payable
during the market development phase. Certain
expenditures are deductible from this fee.
• Duties and other employee income taxes: The
contractor is expected to pay stamp duties for
the appropriate transactions and personal income
taxes on behalf of all expatriate staff. Varying excise
duties are determined for payment on imported
goods.45
• Cost recovery oil: This occurs on a sliding scale
but generally begins with a cap of 40 per cent46 per
25 million barrels of oil equivalent and on a first-in,
first-out basis. Basically, all exploration operations,
annual operating, and annual overhead costs are
recovered on an expense basis in the same year of
incurring the costs. Excess costs not recovered may
be carried forward immediately to the succeeding
year.
• Losses: For the purpose of computing taxes,
losses are carried forward to the succeeding year.
Evaluation of the existing regime
These chosen criteria are not altogether exhaustive but
they are key determinants of an effective tax package.
The useful criterion of ‘‘government risk’’ was,
however, not applied here. This is because ‘‘neutrality’’
and ‘‘early government take’’ fundamentally capture
the various elements of government risk.
Is it neutral?
The number of profit-related taxes47 makes the regime
appear to be moderately neutral.48 This, however,
is not the case because it does not augur well for
the government’s interest. It creates incentive for
companies to exaggerate costs.49 This is because,
despite the different caps on cost recovery, companies
rely on ‘‘cost carry forward’’ to regain inflated costs.
Furthermore, ‘‘questions of cost control, in particular of
the parent company overhead charged very liberally
to local subsidiaries, are not known, settled or even
investigated in depth’’.50 Neither does the bidding
process help matters since the companies may opt
to collude on any particular instrument/variable that
would determine the winner.
The non-neutral nature of the regime becomes
clearer when the issue of tax holidays is considered.
The burden of the tax holiday given to BG Group, for
instance, is still being borne by the Trinis. Meanwhile,
44 Interview with Louise Poy Wing, Senior State Counsel,
Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries, Trinidad and
Tobago, May 12, 2005.
45 See Jobity, n.45 above.
46 See Wing, n.48 above.
47 They are taxes that target accounting profit but ignore the
time value of money.
48 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.109.
49 D. Artana et al., ‘‘Fiscal policy in Trinidad and Tobago: Draft
Document’’, p.27 (www.iadb.org).
50 See Walde, n.32 above.
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Table 1:
Fiscal instrument Content
Bonuses Signature: through bidding or negotiation. Production: through bidding or negotiation
but on a sliding scale.
Royalty52 1.5% per cubic foot (domestic gas). 2% per cubic foot (export gas).
Taxation53 Corporate income (petroleum profit) tax: 50% of taxable profit. Unemployment levy:
5% of chargeable income. Withholding tax: depending on country of remittance,
ranging from 10% to 25%. Oil impost: based on natural gas produced in the previous
year.
Fees and rentals Training: through bidding or negotiation plus 6% per year. Research and development:
through bidding or negotiation plus 6% per year. Technical assistance bonus:
through bidding or negotiation. Administrative fee: $200,000 in the first year; plus
6% in subsequent years. Annual rental (US$ per hectare): 1st year–2.75; 2nd–3.00;
3rd–3.25; 4th–3.50; 5th–3.75; 6th–4.00; then plus 6% in subsequent years.
Cost recovery54 Through bidding or negotiation.
Depreciation Exploration: 100%. Development and production: spread over four years—40%, 20%,
20%, 20%; G and A: expensed in the same year.
Ringfencing Yes—defined by contract area alone.
Govt participation Level varies or may not exist, depending on each PSC.
Minister’s share
profit gas55
Through bidding or negotiation but it involves a sliding scale that increases based on
production and price.
Domestic
obligation
No market obligations but there are various supply and contract obligations.
Source: Extracted from nn.43, 44, 45, 44 and 46 accordingly.
the Consortium is almost completing the Fourth
Train—the production unit.51 When
a tax holiday is too long despite increasing prices
and production levels then the regime becomes non-
neutral. This is because it attracts more investment
than expected and this leads to high exploitation of the
resource. It also makes existing companies produce at
a faster rate. Some even produce almost 25 per cent
of the ultimate recoverable reserves in the first year of
production,56 to the nation’s peril.
How early is the government take?
The existence of presence-related taxes,57 as well as
revenue or production-related taxes,58 actually depicts
early tax take.59 Although the companies’ cash-flows
are negatively affected, in this case, however, the rates
are low relative to the right economic incentives the
companies are faced with.
51 See Wing, n.48 above.
52 See Rampersad, n.38 above.
53 R. Jobity, ‘‘Amendments to the petroleum taxation regime in
1992: will they work?’’, XVIII No.1 Quarterly Economic Bulletin,
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, p.80.
54 K. Bazzey, How have variations in and modifications to PSCs in
Indonesia and Trinidad and Tobago impacted upon the collection of
economic rent? (unpublished manuscript), p.9.
55 D. Johnston, International petroleum fiscal system analysis
(2001), p.116-e.
56 See Johnston, n.29 above, p.71.
57 They are imposed on a company irrespective of whether it
has revenue status.
58 They are imposed immediately production starts or revenue
is generated, irrespective of profitability.
59 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.109.
Specifically, the signature and production bonuses
are fair but the royalty rates are very low relative to
international standards.60 Although there are varying
arguments for the abolition or downward adjustment
of royalties, this author thinks otherwise, especially
in developing countries. The movement away from
revenue and production-related taxes by petroleum-
producing countries around the globe61 does not make
it right. Rather, this paper emphasises that royalties,
though fixed and relatively inflexible, create a strong
incentive for companies to reduce costs and increase
profit. It reduces that incentive for ‘‘gold plating’’ or
inflating foreign overhead costs.62
It is worth mentioning, also, that the deductibility
of ‘‘market development’’ expenses from the annual
holding charge reduces the early government take.
This is worsened by the short depreciation period (four
years) that makes the regime almost entirely back-
ended. This feature of the regime basically improves
the companies’ cash-flows, as well as projects’ NPVs.
Unfortunately, the royalties are too low and the other
revenues accrue in different times given the use of
PSCs.63
At present, the supplementary petroleum tax
(applicable to oil) does not apply to the income from
gas sales. This invariably means that the country has
60 D. Johnston, ‘‘International Petroleum Fiscal System
Analysis: Government Take’’ (www.danieljohnston.com).
61 A. Kemp, ‘‘Pros and cons of petroleum royalties’’, Oxford
Energy Forum, May 1996, p.12.
62 See Walde, n.32 above.
63 See Artana, n.53 above, p.28.
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foregone billions of dollars worth of revenue by the
absence of supplementary petroleum tax on natural
gas.64
Is it stable?
The predominance of profit-related taxes actually
depicts moderate stability in the regime.65 The sliding-
scale nature of the production bonus and the profit
gas contributes increases its flexibility. The higher
cost recovery limit, relative to oil,66 creates room for
adaptability to changes in cost. The fact that the present
regime was amended 13 years ago in 199267 further
confirms this. Previously, however, there were several
minor annual and biennial changes.
The continuous modification of the oil regime for
gas projects, however, may affect its stability because,
domestically and internationally, gas is quite different
from oil.68 For instance, the recent introduction of
distribution system operators into previously existing
PSCs is clearly destabilising.69
The inherent nature of the regime as a PSC gives
further credence to its stability because its twin
features—production split and income tax—permit
more flexibility.70
Is it easy to impose or administer?
The market development expense credit charged
against the annual holding fee makes the tax
administration cumbersome. It practically complicates
the process of liability computation and is open
to ‘‘gold plating’’ by contractors. Furthermore, ‘‘the
lack of the required highly informed and skilled
tax collection ability means that the calculation and
collection of the modern tax package is fraught with
risk’’.71
Despite the deductibility of most expenses and
costs for tax computation, the regime is clearly easy
to administer. This is evident by the number of
fixed fees, bonuses and other revenue-related taxes
that are included in the PSC. Such instruments are
basically easy to administer but difficult to impose.72
The difficulty in setting the parameters arise from
the amount of information required for achieving
optimality.73
The usage of these instruments in a PSC that is
generally viewed as arduous and complex74 clearly
confirms that the regime is not easy to impose.
Is it predictable?
The predominance of profit-related taxes, bidding and
negotiating processes makes the system non-uniform
64 South Trinidad Chamber of Commerce, ‘‘Petroleum
Taxation is not a simple matter’’ (www.southchamber.org).
65 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.109.
66 See Bazzey, n.46 above, p.9.
67 See Jobity, n.45 above, p.71.
68 See Johnston, n.29 above, p.173.
69 ‘‘Tax reform may kill the goose’’,The Trinidad Guardian,
March 10, 2005 (www.guardian.co.tt).
70 G. Barrows, ‘‘A survey of incentives in recent petroleum
contracts’’ in N. Beredjick and T. Walde eds, Petroleum
Investment Policies in Developing Countries (1988), p.227.
71 See Walde, n.32 above, p.7.
72 See Garnaut and Ross, n.22 above, p.167.
73 ibid.
74 See Johnston, n.29 above, p.39.
and unpredictable. It is good for the companies because
they are able to factor in various exploration costs75
relative to the available information on the size and
nature of the gas deposit. It is, however, difficult and
less certain for government to estimate accruable fiscal
revenues from these contracts due to the sliding scale
nature of the instruments and allowances. Royalty that
is certain, in the period of cost recovery, is quite low.
On the whole the regime appears unpredictable.
The unpredictable and uncertain nature of the
revenues accruing from gas is a reason for the creation
of a stabilisation fund in Trinidad and Tobago.76
Practical experience has shown, however, that such
funds are no cure-all.77
Conclusion
Designing a fiscal regime suitable for all mineral
resources in one country is impossible. Resources, like
projects, differ substantially with regard to costs, size
and quality of reserves/deposit, as well as investors’
perception of risk.78 This is clearly the case with oil and
gas in Trinidad and Tobago.
This paper has presented evidence that the existing
tax package is unsuitable for gas. Basically modified
from the oil regime, it seems to muddle up various
instruments and incentives with different, incoherent
and divergent objectives.
Generally, the regime is non-neutral and unpre-
dictable. The entire package makes provision for early
government take but the rates are either low or the
realisable value small. This invariably implies serious
problems with imposing the appropriate tax instru-
ments for early tax take. Furthermore, Trinidad and
Tobago’s PSC for gas treats expenses favourably and
is more attractive to IOCs as it makes the tax burden
lighter relative to that in their home countries.79 The
fact remains, however, that the regime is stable and
easy to administer.
Trinidad and Tobago’s existing fiscal regime for
gas is very generous, despite assertions that it is
‘‘slightly above the global average’’.80 This author
concludes that although the tax take of over 60 per
cent is considered appropriate,81 it is actually being
explored and exploited by IOCs in the global race to
secure natural gas contracts.82 Given the low political
risk, numerous gas projects and the available market
(domestic and export), there is no justification for
being overly generous. A separate fiscal regime for
gas is, therefore, needed to correct some or most of the
anomalies highlighted above.
75 See Bazzey, n.46 above.
76 See Webb-Vidal, n.5 above.
77 T. Baunsgaard, A primer on mineral taxation, IMF Working
Paper WP/01/139, p.24 (www.imf.org).
78 ibid., p.30.
79 See Artana, n.53 above.
80 Mr Inglefield (M.D., PwC) quoted in The Trinidad Guardian,
see n.69 above.
81 ibid.
82 See Rampersad, n.38 above.
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